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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The court held there were no errors in FERC's orders and accordingly denied Knott's petition for review.
Michael Graetz

SECOND CIRCUIT
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. United States Envd. Prot. Agency, 399
F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding some provisions of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency regulation regarding concentrated
animal feeding operation violated the Clean Water Act).
Waterkeeper Alliance, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. and American Littoral Society (collectively "Environmentalists") and American Farm Bureau Federation, National Chicken
Council, and National Pork Producers Council (collectively "Farmers")
challenged a regulation promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regarding water pollutants released
from concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFOs") in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The EPA regulation ("CAFO Rule")
follows from the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which proscribes the release of pollutants from any "point source" into navigable waters,
unless otherwise authorized by permit. The Environmentalists and
Farmers asserted the CAFO Rule violated, or failed to advance the
CWA's goals concerning the permitting scheme, the types of discharges regulated, and the effluent limitation guidelines the CAFO
Rule established.
The Environmentalists objected to the EPA's permitting scheme
because the CAFO Rule allowed the EPA to issue permits without
comprehensive review and without enough specified terms in the permits as to meet the CWA's requirements. They also objected to the
duty to apply for a permit imposed on CAFOs outside the jurisdiction
of the EPA. The CAFO Rule required large CAFOs to develop nutrient
management plans. However, the Environmentalists argued this requirement alone failed to ensure the CAFOs followed through with the
implementation of those plans. The court agreed with the Environmentalists' allegation concerning the lax standards of review for permit
issuance, allowing CAFOs to possibly misrepresent their compliance.
The court also determined the CAFO Rule violated the CWA by failing
to require CAFOs to include the terms of the nutrient management
plans in their permits. The CWA specified that effluent limitations, or
any restrictions enforced by the State regarding quantities, rates, and
concentration of discharge, must be included in the permit. The court
reasoned that the nutrient management plans constituted effluent
limitations and must be included in the permit in order to comply with
the CWA. Finally, the Farmers argued the permitting scheme outlined
in the CAFO Rule allowed the EPA power over CAFOs, or the ability to
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usurp rights, the CWA did not grant. Since the CAFO Rule demanded
that all CAFOs either apply for a permit or prove the CAFOs had no
potential to discharge, the Farmers asserted the EPA broadly regulated
all potential polluters, rather than the actual polluters. The court
agreed this policy, while possibly aligned with the goals of the CWA,
superseded the powers that Congress gave the EPA through the CWA.
Secondly, the Environmentalists and Farmers challenged the CAFO
Rule with regards its stormwater discharge exemption and its regulation of "uncollected" discharges. Under the CAFO Rule, all discharges
of manure, litter, or process wastewater were subject to permit requirements and regulation; however, as long as the CAFOs were acting
in accordance with their specific nutrient management plans, precipitation related discharge or agricultural stormwater were exempt. The
Environmentalists contended the EPA should regulate stormwater like
any other point source for discharge. The court looked to precedent
case law and the express language of the CWA, which exempted agricultural stormwater, and held the CAFO Rule's exemption properly
comported with Congress' intent to limit liability for discharge caused
by nature. The court also dismissed the Farmers' assertion that the
EPA could consider only discharges collected at the area of land application point sources or regulated as such. The court reasoned it was
irrelevant whether the discharge was collected or uncollected at a certain point, because any discharge from a CAFO becomes subject to
regulation.
Thirdly, the Environmentalists attacked the effluent limitations
guidelines the CAFO Rule established. They objected to the guidelines' use of the best available technology ("BAT") standards, the
guidelines' failure to regulate or reduce pathogens in the discharge,
the guidelines' provisions for complying with the production area discharge ban through the creation of a facility or through alternative
performance standards, and the guidelines' lack of water quality based
effluent limitations. Regarding the BAT standards adopted in the
guidelines, the Environmentalists opined that the EPA improperly
chose the standards. The court relied on the record and the evidence
that the EPA did extensive research in determining effective standards,
including choosing the best BAT options for beef and swine regulation. However, the court did not determine the EPA had been as diligent in instituting standards to control pathogen levels. Under the
CWA, the EPA must employ guidelines that advocate the use of the
best conventional technology ("BCT") for controlling pathogens. The
court held the EPA must adopt effluent guidelines specifically for controlling pathogens, rather than relying on the effect of the other guidelines to reduce pathogens. Similarly, the court concluded the EPA did
not justify its adoption of alternative means for CAFOs to comply with
the total prohibition on production area discharge, because the EPA
failed to provide support for this decision in the record and precluded
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public participation in its decision-making process. Finally, the court
held no justification for the lack of water quality based effluent guidelines concerning any discharge, except stormwater existed.
In conclusion, the court vacated the following portions of the
CAFO Rules permitting scheme: (1) the issuance of permits without a
review of the nutrient management plans, (2) the allowance of permits
that failed to specifically identify terms of the nutrient management
plans, and (3) the requirement that all CAFOs to apply for permits or
prove no potential for discharge. The court also held the EPA must
select a BCT standard for pathogen control and clarify, through a publicly accessible process, why its CAFO Rule included an alternative
measure for meeting the production area prohibition and why its
guidelines lacked water quality based limitations.
Lynn Noesner

THIRD CIRCUIT
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2005) (holding the district court correctly determined the existence of
an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the
environment, and that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
required permanent injunctive relief by Honeywell).
From 1895 until 1954, Mutual Chemical Company ("Mutual")
dumped hexavalent chromium waste, creating a carcinogenic landmass consisting of 1,500,000 tons of waste at a wetlands site along the
Hackensack River in Jersey City, New Jersey. In 1982 the State of New
Jersey ("State") sought a permanent remedy after observing a green
stream and plumes on the site. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") ordered Honeywell, Mutual's ultimate successor, to clean up the site. Honeywell implemented an interim measure by pouring concrete over seventeen acres and placing a
plastic cap over the remaining seventeen acres of the thirty-four acre
site. After litigation in 1993, Allied Signal, a predecessor to Honeywell,
promised 60 million dollars towards a permanent solution, but NJDEP
reserved the right to compel cleanup at a higher cost. In 1995 Interfaith Community Organization with five individuals (collectively
"ICO") sued Honeywell under the Resource Conservation and Restoration Act ("RCRA"), alleging the site presented an imminent and substantial danger to public health or the environment. The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled for ICO and
ordered Honeywell to clean up the site. Honeywell appealed to the
United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
On appeal, Honeywell challenged ICO's standing, the district
court's determination that an imminent and substantial endangerment
existed, and the district court's remedial injunction requiring excava-

